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Abstract 
Secret sharing caused a high level of security in encrypted systems. So, there are wide ranges of methods based on the secret sharing 
policies. Secret sharing schemes has 2 main aims. The first is determined to decrease the risks of attacks by adversaries which can be done by 
increasing the number of authorities. Second is to remove the dependence of protocol to an special part. 
In this paper, the priority of parties to share the secret is important. Also different authorities may be given different type of part. We 
also propose some voting systems in order to justify suggested secret sharing protocol. Also we analyze theses protocols to show that this 
secret sharing protocol saves the security of E-voting system.  
Keywords: Priority in secret sharing, Multi-Authority, E-voting system, Elliptic curve, Composition of functions. 
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1 Introduction 
ecently, secret sharing has been an active 
area in different cryptography systems. 
This is mainly because of the fact that it 
can make the security protocols more robust. So, 
there is an endless list of methods based on the 
secret sharing policies. Secret sharing has 2 main 
aims. First aim is to decrease the risks of attacks 
by an exterior person (like adversaries). The 
second one is to prevent system from depending 
just on one part. Advances in different schemes 
are rooted from two main ideas. The first one can 
be regarded as using different mathematical 
tools in order to find better ways to share a 
secret. Some example of mathematical tools can 
be interpolation of polynomials like in [Shamir,  
1979], intersection of hyperplane like in 
[Blakley,1978], graph based schemes like in 
[Blundo,1995], using group theory like in 
[Liu,1998], designing by quantum cryptosystems 
like in [Cleve, 1999], [Hillery,1999]. Also [Beimel, 
2011] is a good survey of different secret sharing 
methods. The second idea is to introduce some 
new applications which are suitable for different 
scenario. These applications results in some 
facilities. For example, Ingmarsen et all. in 
[Ingemarsson,1991] proposed a scenario in secret 
sharing without depending on a trusted center. 
Also there are some papers to investigate 
different conditions among authorities to have a 
fair sharing process. For example Tian et al. 
proposed a fair threshold secret sharing scheme 
in [Tian, 2013]. There are some works which are 
aimed at image secret sharing like in [Wang, 
2007] and [Shyong, 2014]. There are some works 
which updates shares of members based on their 
interactions which is known as social secret 
sharing. For example in [Nojoumian, 2010] 
proposed an scheme to change the parties 
without changing the secret based on 
participants' cooperation. 
      One of the active application of secret sharing 
protocols in cryptosystems is E-voting systems. 
E-voting systems with multi-authority need 
secret sharing protocol to be more robust. Also it 
is better to not implement a trusted center. Some 
examples of multi-authority can be found in 
[Cramer, 1997], [Porkodi, 2011] and [Fouard, 
2007]. Also [Weber, 2006] provided some typical 
ideas to illustrate the role of secret sharing in E-
voting systems.  
      In this paper, we propose a new facility in 
secret sharing. This is rooted from a problem 
which arises in previous secret sharing protocols. 
The main contribution of this paper is to 
introduce a new facility of secret sharing in E-
voting systems. In particular, we set priority in 
order of sharing parties by using composition of 
functions.  
       The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 is devoted to a brief review of some 
secret sharing schemes. We review a couple of E-
voting schemes which are handy for us in this 
paper in section 3. Section 4 discussed two 
problems which have remained for this paper to 
solve. We propose a method of sharing to solve 
these problems in this section, too. In section 5, 
we design an E-voting system in order to 
indicate that proposed method is applicable. 
Section 6 is aimed at introducing our future 
works. Last section is the conclusion. 
2 Review of some secret sharing 
protocols 
2.1 What is secret sharing? 
Threshold secret schemes are introduced 
by raising the following problem by Shamir in 
1979. 
How one can share a secret among n  people 
such that each t  one can find the secret and each     
set of 1t one can’t gain anything. 
There are a couple of conditions which 
each threshold secret sharing has to contain 
them. These conditions are as follows. 
Correctness: Each t  one can find the 
secret. 
Privacy: Each 1t one can’t find anything 
about the secret. 
We propose two schemes briefly (For 
more schemes, see [Beimel, 2011]). 
 
 
R 
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2.2 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme 
 
Shamir used interpolation of polynomials to 
find an answer for mentioned problem. He 
supposed that ][)( xFxf p  is a polynomial 
with degree 1t . He assumed that )0(fs   is 
the secret and shared )(ifsi   as the parties for 
each one. One can see that if t out of n one share 
their secret parties, they can find f and 
particularly s . So correctness is satisfied.  
Also it is easy to see that there are p different 
polynomials satisfying in each 1t points. So 
if p is big enough, privacy is guaranteed.  
 
2.3 Jointly Secret Sharing Scheme 
 
One of the main questions which arises in 
Shamir scheme is its need to a trusted center in 
order to choose the polynomial. However, it is 
not very desired, since a trusted center is usually 
hard to find. Also sharing one's piece of parties is 
needed sometimes. If everyone can share his/her 
parties, then he/she can share it to all of his/her 
trusted people. In this way, if he/she is absent 
and all of his/her trusted people are present in 
sharing process, they can find his/her part. 
Jointly secret sharing scheme is proposed to 
solve these problems.  
In this method, first i th one choose a 
polynomial with degree 1t  and send it with 
private channel. Then the polynomial 
i
i
ff  
is calculated and )0()0()0( 1 nfffs    
is considered as the secret. Also )(ifsi   is 
chosen as the i th one's secret part. Then i th one 
with it  trusted people chooses a polynomial ig  
with degree 1it  such that )0(ii gs  . Then 
i th one send )( jgi  with private channel to 
his/her j th trusted one. 
If t out ofn one share their parties, they 
can find f and s . Also if one participant is 
absent, but his/her trusted ones share their 
parties which he/she entrusted them, they can 
find part of their absent friend. This methods 
satisfies correctness and privacy same as Shamir 
scheme and does not need any trusted center. 
Also each one can share his/her part to his/her 
trusted friend.  
 
3 Secret sharing in E-voting protocols 
 
3.1 Elliptic Curves 
 
Every elliptic curve can be considered as an 
algebraic curve with the following equation (See 
[Koblitz, 1987]). 
(1)  baxxy  32 
The set of points on the curve with the 
following operation, make a group. Addition of 
two point ),( 111 yxP  and ),( 222 yxP  is  
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Getting k  from kP  is known as discrete 
logarithm problem which is very hard to solve. 
In fact, if PNP  , this problem does not have 
any solution with polynomial order. So it can be 
used for cryptosystem.  
 
3.2 Secret Sharing For Voters and 
Authorities 
 
There are two kinds of groups in almost all of 
voting protocols.  
Voters: People who vote. It is clear that these 
people should not share their secret to others, if 
the system is anonymous. So secret sharing is 
useless among voters.  
Authorities: People who make process on 
votes. There are two kinds of systems based on 
number of voters: with one authority or multi 
authority. It is possible to exploit secret sharing 
schemes in multi authority protocols.  
It is possible to share a secret in multi 
authority systems in different ways. For example 
in [Cramer, 1997] and [Porkodi, 2011], Shamir 
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secret sharing scheme is used. Also protocol in 
[Weber, 2006] uses jointly secret sharing scheme.  
 
3.3 An E-voting system with shamir secret 
sharing 
 
Cramer proposed a homomorphic E-voting 
protocol based on ElGamel with Shamir secret 
sharing scheme in [Cramer, 1997]. Then Porkodi 
improved this protocol by using ECC based 
cryptosystem in [Weber, 2006].  
We review the protocol with two candidates 
which was designed by Porkodi. First, center 
chooses point P , field pGF , secret key s  and 
polynomial f . Then center sends )(ifsi   to 
each authority as his/her private key. Next, 
PshsPh ii  ,  is announced in bulletin board 
by center as public keys of center. Then each 
voter encrypts his/her vote }1,1{ iv  by 
ElGamel system as follows and send it with a 
zero knowledge proof of authentication in 
bulletin board.  
(5
) 
),(),( 2,1, PvhPccc iiiiii        
After the end of voting, authorities compute 
summation of all votes ),( 21 ccc   and i th 
authority announces csi  with his/her proof of 
knowledge in bulletin board. If a subset of t  
honest authorities (name this subset J ) share 
their result, then one can see the following by 
Shamir secret sharing scheme. 
(6) 
 
  

Jj jkJk
js
jk
k
s
,
)(                 
so 
(7) 
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and finally 
(8) 
  

dPPsdPsP
scc
ii )()(
12

                         
It is enough to form the following table and 
find d  (result of voting) thanks to dP  table 
checking. 
},,,0,,,)1(,{ NPPPPNNP    (9) 
 
3.4 An E-voting system with jointly 
secret sharing 
 
Weber in [Weber, 2006] exploits jointly secret 
sharing to propose a coercion-resistant E-voting 
protocol. His protocol resists against threats for 
voters because of the fact that each voters can 
vote more than once and he used a part of 
mixers, blind signature and homomorphic idea 
in his proposed voting system. He could find 
some ways to speed up this method, too. There 
are four steps in his protocol. We review them in 
very brief way, but we omit mixing process. This 
is because of the fact that we want to show the 
effect of secret sharing in more explicit way. The 
following protocol is not coercion-resistant.  
 
First step: Setting up   
 
Each authority like iA  chooses  pi Fx   and 
polynomial if  with degree 1t  such that 
ii xf )0(  in order to choose a secret key for the 
protocol. Then he/she sends )( jf i  to his/her 
j th trusted person by private channel. He/she 
sends i
x
g  by public channel. Also the public 
form of secret key is announced in bulletin board 
as follows.  
 
(9) 


n
i
x
A
igpk
1
 
     Then each authority checks other authorities' 
public key. Finally the hash tables and keys 
),( ii zh  are designed. These tables are designed 
for zero knowledge proofs. 
 
      Second step: Registering Voters  
 
      Each authority sends secret key i  to voters. 
This key is used for proof of authentication.  
 
      Third step: Vote casting  
 
      Each voter chooses a random number k . 
He/she sends his/her vote as follows with a zero 
knowledge proof of authentication. 
 
(11) ),(),( j
k
A
k vpkgyx  
 
      Fourth step: Tallying  
 
      First, each authority checks proofs of 
authentication. Then they tally the votes as 
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follows. If there exists t  honest authorities who 
share their results, one can find all ii xf ,  for 
each i  using jointly secret sharing. 
 
Finally, 
dg  is computed (public form of result) 
by multiplying all ballots and d  can be found by 
forming the following table. 
(11) },,,1,,,{ 1 nn gggg   
4 A Problem in Reviewed Secret 
Sharing Scheme 
 
 Above mentioned protocols had not paid 
attention to the difference role of people in 
sharing process. There are some methods which 
paid attention to the people in different 
categories which can be found in [Benaloh, 1990].  
But it is not possible to stop sharing protocol by 
a specific category and there is not priority in 
order of sharing. To put it simply, there is no 
difference that A shares his/her parties first or B 
does it first. The difference among authorities 
which was considered in past research goes back 
to increase the number of parties of one person 
to increase his/her role in sharing. In this way, 
one member is more important than others. But 
in general there is no protocol which consider 
the importance of priority in sharing. This causes 
some problems. To illustrate these problems in 
application, take the following example.  
Suppose that one of mentioned secret sharing 
protocols is applied in a university. The ones 
who can share the secret are as follows. There are 
5 members in security part, 4, 6 and 6 members 
in education, financial and research part, 2 
professors of science and 2 professors of 
Engineering department. So there are 25 keys 
and the secret sharing scheme which is 
implemented is (25, 14) Shamir threshold secret 
sharing.  
Assume that there is a top secret document 
which is aimed at education in engineering 
department. Now suppose that 6 financial and 6 
research expertise and 2 professors from science 
are willing to share their secret. These 14 people 
can find document, while no one from 
engineering department is not in sharing 
process. Also there is no expert in educational 
matters. In this situation, there is not even 
someone from security part to prevent or control 
the sharing process and decides how to take care 
of security proceedings after reading the secret.  
As one can see, these problems are remained 
to solve. In the sequel, we propose a new secret 
sharing scheme which can solve these problems. 
The main idea of our method can be applied in a 
lot of secret sharing methods. We implement it 
on Shamir secret sharing. 
 
5 Proposed method in jointly secret 
sharing based on Shamir scheme 
 
We assume that there are some layers with 
some parts in each of them in this method. Also 
we mean that person or part A has priority 
according to person or part B in secret sharing, if 
B cannot share his/her secret when A has not do 
it. The main purpose is to make priority among 
layers. Also there is not priority among people in 
parts of same layer. 
There is one polynomial for each part. To do 
this, we use multiplication of polynomials for 
each part and composition of polynomials for 
each layer. If one has all of these polynomials, 
he/she can find the main polynomial and 
consequently the secret key of the protocol. 
Let there are L  layers, iM  parts for i th 
layer and jin ,  one in j th part of i th layer. 
Assume that one needs jim ,  one to find the 
polynomial of j th part of i th layer with the 
condition 1, jim . So it is enough to choose a 
polynomial jif ,  with degree jim , . Then k th 
one in j th part of i th layer is received jif ,  as 
his secret parties. 
If there are jit ,  member (name them 1J ) in 
j th part of i th layer, then jis ,  can be 
represented as follows.  
(12) 
 
  

l lJj jkJk
ji
jk
k
s ))((
,
,
 
     Now  jii sS , is considered as the key of 
i th layer. If one has if  in each layer and 
considering the following equation, one can find 
)0(fs   which is chosen as the key of protocol. 
(13) 
Lfff  ...1 
 (Function if  is equal to  jif , ).  
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According to threshold condition, each part 
needs to have some members who are willing to 
share their parties in order to reveal the 
polynomial of each part. So if we consider the 
first (or last) function for security part, then it is 
easy to stop the sharing protocol, if security part 
detects any adversary or traitor or danger. Also 
if he/she finds out that the secret document 
needs some more measures to reveal, he can 
prepare the condition. Moreover, for each secret, 
there are some relevant experts in sharing 
protocols. Generally this protocol can be applied 
to joint secret sharing. However, in voting 
application, these two process cannot be applied 
at the same time. This is mainly because of 
existence of public key. It requires to do more 
research for some special cases when one needs 
to have a jointly secret sharing with priority in E-
voting protocol. We introduce a voting protocol 
which is based on the protocol in [Porkodi, 2011]. 
 
6 Proposed secret sharing scheme in E-
voting based on ECC and Shamir secret 
sharing 
 
We propose a voting system based on 
protocol in [Porkodi, 2011] and our method in 
secret sharing. This system has the following 
parts.  
1- Trusted center  
2- L  layers for authorities and in one in 
i th layer. 
3- M  Voters  
4- Two candidates  
5- Verifiers  
Our purpose is that if there are im  
authorities in i th layer, then one can find the 
polynomial of that part. There are 3 steps in our 
proposed protocol.  
 
First step: Setting up  
 
First, center chooses keys is , prime 
numbers qp, , elliptic curve pE , polynomials 
jif ,  with degree jim ,  and point P  on elliptic 
curve. 
     Also )0(ii fs  is considered as the secret key 
of i th layer.  Finally polynomial if  is as follows 
(15) 
Lfff  1 
       The total secret key )0(fs   (secret key of 
center) is assumed. Next, center sends 
)(, kfs iki   for k th authority in i th layer by 
private channel. Also he/she computes 
Psh kiki ,,  . Then he/she announces 
pEpqP ,,,  and kih ,  in bulletin board.  
        Also center computes 
    Pxfhhxh r
rrr )(),()( 21  .  
        After that center ignores all coefficients of 
,,,1 32 xx . So the remaining part is a 
polynomial   in pF  like follows. 
),(),()( 2121
rrrrr xexellxl   
        Then center finds 
    )(
1
1
1 iii lhW     
       and then find 
1il . 
        Where )0(1
rr hW   and for each 
},,2,1{ ri   
    Pxfhhxh i
iii )(),()( 1
1
2
1
1
1

   
Then center announced 
0lh   in bulletin 
board. Finally voters are registered and are given 
ia  by center. 
 
Second step: Vote Casting  
 
Every voter sends his/her vote }1,1{ iv  
with zero knowledge proof of authentication as 
follows.  
(17) 
),( PvhaPaB iii
i  
where ia  is a random number.  
 
Third step : Tally computing  
 
Each authority computes the vector 
 iBB  where each iB  is an honest ballot. 
Then he/she blinds first entry of B  by 
computing kiki usB ,,1  . Then he/she sends it 
to bulletin board. If there exists im  ones in i th 
layer (Name this set of participants as iJ ), then 
rsB1  can be found as follows. First, the r th layer 
computes 
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(18) 
 






ir ir
Jl
ki
lk
Jl
r
Bs
lk
xk
Bxf
1,
,
1
))((
)(
 
Then this layer finds 
ry  by ignoring constant 
and coefficients with degree more than one. If 
we assume ),( dPhPB   , then it is easy to 
see that 
rr ly   
Then layer 1r computes 1ry as follows. 
First, They find 11 )( Bxfr . Then he ignores 
constant and coefficients with degree more than 
one and finds 
1ry . It is obvious that  
11   rr ly   
Note that it is impossible to find  , since one 
has to solve a discrete logarithm problem which 
is impossible. If we continue this way, it is easy 
to prove that by induction that  
1 ii ly   
So each layer like i  computes 
iy and sends it 
to 1i th layer. In this way, hly   00  can 
be computed finally. Then hBdP  2  is 
computed where d  is the result of voting. 
Finally one can find d  by forming a table. 
 
7 Analysis of the secret sharing 
protocol and Future works  
 
Our proposed protocol gives priority in secret 
sharing which is a little harder to be attacked. 
This is mainly because of two reasons. First is 
that it is hard to find a specific number in each 
part to cheat them or get their keys by force. Also 
betraying of a part (no matter how big is this 
part) cannot be enough to find the key.  But in 
the meanwhile, one layer can be broken easier 
than before. Since secret of each layer is 
dependent of less people.  
Here we investigate privacy and correctness 
in this method. In order to demonstrate the 
correctness, first we should show that 
correctness is true in each layer. This is because 
of the fact that sharing in each layer is a 
threshold shamir secret sharing and this results 
in the correctness in each layer satisfies. Hence 
one can find the polynomial of each layer, if the 
threshold condition of that layer is satisfied. So 
because of equations (14) and correctness of each 
layer, correctness of protocol is proved. 
To prove privacy, suppose that less than 
number of threshold participants want to share 
their secret. So threshold condition of at least one 
layer is not satisfied. Assuming privacy of 
threshold shamir secret sharing, it is impossible 
to find the polynomial of that layer. So because 
of (14) it is impossible to find the polynomial of 
protocol. So privacy is satisfied.  
Moreover, we discuss 2 factors fairness and 
robustness of proposed E-voting system to 
justify our claim about security in an application 
of mentioned secret sharing protocol. The 
condition of fairness is satisfied, if and only if the 
result is announced exactly after sharing process 
of the last layer of authorities. Also there is 
impossible that one traitor layer can announced 
the results before the voting is finished. Because 
even if it has the keys to compute its result form 
(
iy ), it cannot has the keys of next layers, unless 
all of layers are willing to betray which is not our 
assumption. Moreover, during the vote casting 
phase, finding the result of voting in each 
moment is even harder than voting based on 
ordinary secret sharing schemes. This results 
from existence of more than one layer which has 
to be attacked. Also it is more unlikely that there 
exists more betrayers than threshold of that 
layer. So proposed E-voting scheme is more 
robust. It is more desired that threshold of each 
layer be more than one authority. 
In the future works, we aimed at analyzing 
this protocol and improve it for different kinds 
of attacks. Also we will try to find an E-voting 
protocol which can exploit both jointly sharing 
and priority at the same time. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
We reviewed some secret sharing schemes 
and E-voting protocol in this paper. Also we 
proposed a new method of secret sharing which 
provides priority in sharing. To do this, we 
exploited composition of functions which is a 
non-commutative operation. Then we 
implemented this contribution in voting system 
[Porkodi, 2011] to justify proposed sharing 
method. Finally we analyzed proposed secret 
sharing protocol. 
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